This paper analyzes the conduct of monetary policy in an environment in which cyclical swings in risk appetite affect households' propensity to save. It uses a New-Keynesian model featuring external habit formation to show that taking note of precautionary saving motives justifies an accommodative policy bias in the face of persistent, adverse disturbances. Equally, policy should be more restrictive -i.e. `lean against the wind' -following positive shocks. Since the size of these `risk-adjustments' is increasing in the degree of macroeconomic volatility, ignoring this channel could lead to larger policy errors in turbulent times -with good luck translating into good policy.
Introduction
A lot of modern policy analysis is conducted using linear, or linearized, models. While these may be able to replicate salient features of macroeconomic dynamics, there are important areas where their ability to 'match data' is less satisfactory. In particular, all such models ignore the impact of uncertainty on the transmission mechanism of shocks. 1 Agents in these models do not require compensation for holding risky assets nor do they save for precautionary reasons.
To the extent that risk premium is a significant determinant of asset price data and precautionary savings are a clear feature of macro data, using models so badly misspecified along these dimensions could result in systematically biased policy recommendations. In what follows we investigate this issue in more depth.
The impact of nonlinearities and risk on economic dynamics has recently been the subject of considerable attention (e.g. Rubio-Ramirez and FernndezVillaverde (2005) ; Andreasen (2008) ; Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) ; Hordahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2008) ; Ravenna and Seppala (2006) ). Rather than trying to analyze many aspects of uncertainty, we start by focusing on just oneprecautionary savings. 2 The importance of precautionary motives has long been recognized with some estimates suggesting that they account for 40% of all wealth 1 All linear models are 'certainty-equivalent' and coefficients of their policy functions are independent of uncertainty (shock volatility).
2 There has been some ambiguity as to what exactly precautionary savings are -see also 2 accumulation. 3 Moreover, since we are interested in monetary policy implications of uncertainty, incorporating a channel which directly affects equilibrium interest rates seems fundamental. Finally, focusing on a single aspect of risk makes it easier to establish traction with standard models used for policy analysis and allows us to derive our results analytically.
We believe that a models' ability to match the dynamics of risk-premia is a good diagnostic of whether it accounts for risk correctly. Since the benchmark macro model fails to do so, we extend it by introducing persistent external habits -whose appeal in the asset-pricing context was demonstrated by Campbell and Cochrane (1999) . In our framework, external habits generate cyclical swings in risk aversion, which translate into fluctuations in the desire to save for precautionary reasons. Crucially, to make this channel relevant, we consider a non-linear approximation to the consumption-Euler equation -explicitly allowing for a state-dependent precautionary-saving motive.
Our first contribution is to characterize factors determining the cyclical properties of precautionary savings. We show that these factors match those driving the dynamics of risk premia. Accordingly, a model in which risk premia vary in line with the data is likely to generate countercyclical precautionary saving motives. We also find that a countercyclical coefficient of risk aversion, which is a standard feature of all habit models, might not be sufficient to generate such dynamics. What is necessary is that the persistence of shocks and habits is sufficiently high -i.e. agents must expect a fall in living conditions to persist in Floden (2008) . Our usage of the term is closest to that in Kimball (1990) and implies that, absent uncertainty, there would be no precautionary savings. Our model assumes complete financial markets and precautionary savings do not arise from borrowing or liquidity constraints as in Deaton (1991) or Huggett and Ospina (2001) .
3 See also Carroll and Samwick (1998) . Other papers highlighting the importance of precautionary savings include Leland (1968) , Sandmo (1970) , Carroll (1992) , Kazarosian (1997) or Ludvigson and Michaelides (2001) .
3 order for higher risk aversion to translate into a greater desire to save. 4 We then analyze policy implications of such swings in precautionary saving motives. We derive expressions for the 'natural' rate of interest -i.e. the one that would prevail if prices were fully flexible -both in a linear, 'certainty-equivalent' setup and in a world in which agents save for precautionary reasons. In doing so, we characterize monetary policy consistent with price stability in both setups. 5
We find that properly accounting for swings in risk appetite and the desire to save reduces the appropriate monetary policy response to productivity shocks.
Following a positive productivity shock central bankers striving to maintain price stability cut rates to boost demand and prevent falls in the price level. However, since a persistent positive productivity shock also reduces agents' desire to save for precautionary reasons, the cut in rates required to boost demand is smaller -i.e. the intertemporal substitution effect is partially offset by swings in the precautionary motive. Conversely, given that a positive demand shock merits interest rate hikes -and since associated falls in precautionary motives exacerbate the increases in demand -policy needs to respond more strongly once changes in precautionary savings are accounted for. Overall, the precautionary channel introduces a contractionary bias during booms, and an accommodative slant during downturns.
Our analytical expressions show that the size of the 'precautionary correction' is increasing in the degree of shock volatility. The implication is that ignoring the impact of swings in risk appetite and precautionary behavior would tend to 4 These conditions closely mirror those for risk premium countercyclicality derived in De Paoli and Zabczyk (2008) . As a result, and as discussed in that paper, our model is likely to exhibit desirable asset pricing properties. 5 Amato and Laubach (2004) find that price stability is not fully optimal in the presence of habits. However, such a policy is not quantitatively far from the social optimum -see also footnote 13. For this reason, and to obtain analytical results, we focus on such a policy.
lead to larger systematic policy mistakes in highly turbulent times, when shock volatility is large. In our model, a period of good luck -i.e. low macroeconomic volatility -translates into good policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we present the model. We also characterize the linearized system of equilibrium conditions and the corresponding natural rate of interest. In Section 3, we incorporate the precautionary savings channel and analyze its implications for the natural rate of interest and thus monetary policy. We then use simulations to illustrate our results and inspect their robustness before summarizing and highlighting possible extensions.
Model
Our model economy is inhabited by a continuum of consumer-producers living on the unit interval (and indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]). Agents are assumed to maximize expected utility, which is given by
where C j t denotes agent j's consumption, X t is the level of habits and ξ d,t is a preference shock. The second term in the large bracket captures the disutility of producing y t (j) units of the differentiated output good given productivity denoted by ξ y,t . 6 6 Given the Calvo price setting specification that we subsequently adopt, households' production income could be different depending on the type of good produced. In the remainder, as in Woodford (2003) , we assume that there exist competitive financial markets in which these risks are efficiently shared.
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We define the coefficient of relative risk aversion as 7
where surplus consumption S t is given by
and U y (·, ·) denotes the partial derivative of utility function U (·, ·) with respect to y. Since this coefficient measures agents' willingness to enter pure consumption gambles, given habits equal to X t , it can be referred to as consumption risk aversion. It is easy to show that ϑ(C t , X t ) is countercyclical, when -as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) -S t is used as a measure of cyclical stance.
We assume that habits X t are 'external' -i.e. individual agents treat them as exogenous. We adopt a slow-moving habit specification under which
where φ controls the persistence of the habit process and small letters denote log-deviations from steady state. We further assume that both preference and productivity shocks are autoregressive processes given by
with ε x,t ≡ log(ξ x,t ) and the disturbances x, t+1 being mean zero, uncorrelated i.i.d. random variables with variance given by σ 2 x , x ∈ {d, y}. Aggregate consumption and price indices, C t and P t , are defined as
As noted in Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) 6 where σ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between the differentiated varieties.
Conditional on the specification above, we can characterize agents' intratemporal and intertemporal decisions. Optimality implies, respectively
Alternatively, we could rewrite the consumption Euler equation as
where the stochastic discount factor M t+1 is defined as
Prices are assumed to follow a partial adjustment ruleà la Calvo (1983) . Producers of differentiated goods know the form of their individual demand functions,
given by (5), and maximize profits taking aggregate demand Y t and the price level P t as given. In each period, a fraction α ∈ [0, 1) of randomly chosen producers is not allowed to change the nominal price of their output. The remaining fraction of firms, given by (1 − α), chooses prices optimally by maximizing the expected discounted value of profits. The optimal choice of producer j allowed to reset his price at time t can be shown to satisfy
where y t,T (j) is producer j's time t estimate of demand for his good at time T , should he be unable to reset his price p t (j) before period T . It can be proved that equation (9) implies that the price index evolves according to
where we exploit the fact that all producers who reset prices at time t equate them to p t .
Finally, we close the model with a monetary policy rule. In fact, most of the analysis to follow assumes that the central bank follows a targeting rule that ensures price stability -i.e it sets π t ≡ log(P t+1 /P t ) = 0 for every t as to replicate the flexible price allocation. But such a target could be implemented using an instrumental rule (e.g. Gali (2008) , Chapter 4). This allows us to draw conclusions for a central bank that uses interest rates to achieve price stability (arguably, a more realistic representation of how monetary policy is conducted). 8
In the final section of the paper we explicitly consider the case in which the monetary authority follows a Taylor-type rule.
The system is closed by the market clearing condition C t = Y t . To keep the model parsimonious and allow for analytical representation of the results our framework abstracts from capital, there is no storage technology, and agents are homogenous -as in the canonical New Keynesian model. Effectively, this means that in equilibrium there are no savings. Nevertheless, agents willingness to save does affect dynamics and is reflected in the Euler equation. We can now summarize the log-linearized system of equilibrium conditions as
where
From the system above we can derive the equilibrium interest rate consistent 8 The reason why we choose to solve the model using targeting rules rather than instrumental rules is that in this case the order of approximation of the Euler equation is irrelevant for the dynamics of other variables.
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with price stability in a linear world
where x * is the flexible-price level of habits and where
Expression (11) shows that the interest rate consistent with full price stability falls [rises] following a positive supply [demand] shock -with the magnitude of the response, on impact, given by
Cyclical Risk Aversion and Precautionary Saving
We now consider the minimum departure from a linear model in which we can analyze the impact of cyclical swings in risk aversion and precautionary saving motives on economic dynamics. As a first step, we retain the linear specification of equilibrium conditions other than the Euler equation (7) -an approach that is similar to the one commonly used in the macro-finance literature. 9 This allows us to single out the effect of precautionary savings in the model's dynamics. Also, under this assumption we can obtain analytical solutions for the determinants of precautionary behaviour. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we relax this assumption later in the paper and assess the implications of having a non-linear approximation to the entire model.
So to capture the precautionary savings motive we exploit the fact that under 9 Many macro-finance papers consider a linearized macro model while Euler equations for asset prices, such as the risk-free rate, are determined recursively and approximated non-linearly (see, for example, Jermann (1998)).
conditional log-normality of M t the Euler condition (7) becomes 10
Precautionary savings effect (12) where m t+1 ≡ log(M t+1 /M) and the upper bar denotes steady state values. So, although in our framework there are no actual savings, the interest rate that clears the bond market is affected by agents' willingness to save both for precautionary and intertemporal smoothing reasons.
While linear models capture the intertemporal substitution effect, they ignore the term var t (m t+1 ). This term summarizes how uncertainty affects interest rates through changes in agents' willingness to amass precautionary savings. Accordingly, to analyze how the precautionary savings channel affects the transmission mechanism of shocks, we need to understand the determinants of var t (m t+1 ). In particular, we would like to evaluate how such precautionary motives change over the cycle. Defining
we can write
As shown in the Appendix, the covariance term in Equation (14) is necessarily countercyclical. And given that shocks are homoskedastic (i.e. σ 2 d is constant), the cyclical properties of var t (m t+1 ) depend solely on var t (m t+1 ). Accordingly, we approximate this term to third order, the lowest which allows for time variation
Equation (15) highlights three channels through which uncertainty affects investors' behavior: the overall level of macroeconomic volatility -given by σ 2 y and σ 2 d ; investors' risk aversion -given by ρ which in turn determines κ 1 ; current and past economic conditions -as summarized by the state variable x t and shocks ε y,t , and ε d,t .
Equation (15) demonstrates that as long as investors are risk averse uncertainty affects their consumption decisions (ρ > 0 ⇒ κ 1 > 0). It also illustrates that without habit formation (h = 0) the strength of the precautionary saving motive would not vary over the cycle (κ y = κ d = κ x = 0 ⇒ var t (m t+1 ) is constant). 12 Furthermore, inspecting expression (16) reveals that
which means that if shocks affecting economic activity are sufficiently persistent and habits adjust slowly, then var t (m t+1 ) changes countercyclically. Accordingly, investors will increase their willingness to engage in precautionary saving 11 Note that rather than take the full third order approximation to the Euler equation here we only approximate the variance term. This restriction -which permits us to single out the precautionary savings effect and allows us to derive tractable analytical results -is relaxed in our numerical exercises. 12 Section A.1 in the Appendix shows that, in this case, not only is vart(mt+1) constant, but vart(mt+1) is also time invariant.
following bad shocks if they expect future economic conditions to remain poor (consumption to remain persistently close to the habit level).
If, on the other hand, the expectation is for an improvement in economic prospects, then negative shocks might not translate into higher precautionary savings -even if the coefficient of risk aversion given by (2) increases. This is because if habits are fast moving and consumption recovers quickly, investors faced with the bad shock will rapidly get used to lower levels of consumption while at the same time, the latter quickly recovers. This means that investors actually expect consumption to be far above its habit level in the future and therefore might be less inclined to engage in precautionary savings. As discussed in De Paoli and Zabczyk (2008), similar conditions are necessary to ensure that risk premia are countercyclical.
Precautionary Saving and Monetary Policy
The implications of precautionary saving for interest rates will, therefore, depend on the structural characteristics of the economy. Absent consumption habits, with time invariant risk aversion, the presence of uncertainty will affect the average level of the natural interest rate, but not its dynamics. In this case, the response of the natural interest rate to shocks would not be affected by buffer-stock saving motives. In the general case, however, changes in perceived uncertainty (captured by changes in var t (m t+1 )) would generate fluctuations in the equilibrium interest rate -with ramifications for the conduct of monetary policy. Amato and Laubach (2004) show that in a New Keynesian model with external habits, similar to ours, 'despite the fact that stabilization is not complete
[the optimal volatility of inflation] is quite low'. 13 So in what follows, we consider the case in which the central bank's goal is to maintain price stability. Crucially, if the monetary authority uses interest rates as an instrument to achieve this goal, then knowing the behavior of the natural rate of interest would be key -as policy rates that ensure price stability track this rate. But how does precautionary behavior affect the natural rate and, thus, the appropriate policy response to shocks?
Equation (11) implies that the magnitude of responses of the natural rate to a productivity shock in a 'linear' world is given by κ 1 . When accounting for uncertainty, the size of these responses also depends on the cyclicality of precautionary savings. If shocks and habits are persistent, and thus precautionary behavior is countercyclical, then the response to shocks is dampened. That is, the precautionary savings effect (captured by κ y > 0 in Equation (15)) counterbalances the intertemporal substitution effect (captured in Equation (11)). A negative productivity shock increases the perceived riskiness of the economic environment, which raises investors' willingness to save and puts downward pressure on interest rates.
As a result, the equilibrium interest rate that is consistent with stable prices will be lower than in a linear economy. These results thus suggest that interest rates should respond less to productivity shocks when precautionary savings are taken into account. A similar conclusion would be reached if we were considering other types of supply shocks -such as markup shocks. 14 Note that our analysis evaluates the implications of allowing for higher order approximations (as to capture the precautionary savings effect) in a model with habits. This is different than the analysis of Amato and Laubach (2004) who 13 In Amato and Laubach (2004) , Table 1 , final column -which considers the calibration closest to ours -the optimal volatility of inflation is less that 0.2%. 14 Markup shocks would enter the system of equilibrium conditions in a similar way to productivity shocks, except with a different sign.
assess the differences in the dynamics of interest rates in a linear model with and without habits. Their findings suggest that habits increase the size of interest rates fluctuations because it increases the intertemporal substitution effect. This is also found in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) . Our analysis, on the other hand, focuses on the fact that, in a model with habits, allowing time-varying risk aversion to affect agents willingness to save reduces the response of the natural rate to productivity shocks.
We now consider the case of preference shocks. Condition (18) shows that when uncertainty is introduced in a model that features persistent shocks and habits, negative preference shocks also lead to higher precautionary savings. But in this case incorporating uncertainty magnifies the impact of the shock. That is, the precautionary savings effect (captured by κ d > 0 in Equation (15)) reinforces the intertemporal substitution effect (captured in Equation (11)). Accordingly, in such settings, policymakers striving for price stability should respond more aggressively to demand shocks.
Higher precautionary savings can be thought of as introducing an extra negative demand shock -both following negative productivity and preference shocks.
Since productivity and demand shocks call for opposite interest rate reactions (when policymakers' aim is to maintain price stability) these results suggest that depending on the source of the shock, policy that ignores precautionary savings will either undershoot or overshoot its' appropriate level. But the general prescription is that following expansionary shocks (i.e. a positive demand or supply shock) monetary policy should be more restrictive than in a certainty equivalent world, while when the shocks are contractionary monetary policy should be more accommodative.
Quantitative analysis
The analysis developed so far offered an analytical representation of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. However, a numerical illustration of differences in policy responses is of independent interest since it sheds some light on the quantitative relevance of our results. The numerical simulations also allow us to assess the implications of relaxing the assumption of linearity in the supply condition.
Some numerical simulations
For our calibration we define one period as a quarter and set β = 0.99 to yield a 4% annualized steady-state real interest rate. As in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) the parameter ρ is equal to 2.37 and the degree of habit persistence φ is set to 0.97. Following Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) we assume a value of 6 for the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply η and set α = 0.66 to obtain an average length of price contracts of 3 quarters. The elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods σ is assumed to take the value of 10 in line with Benigno and Woodford (2005) . Similar to Juillard, Karam, Laxton, and Pesenti (2006) and Banerjee and Batini (2003) we calibrate the habit size parameter to h = 0.85. As in Wouters (2003, 2007) , the persistence of productivity and preference shocks is set to 0.997 and 0.9 respectively, and the variance of productivity shocks is 3.5 times higher than that of preference shocks. More specifically, once the decreased desire to save is taken into account, the magnitude of the change in interest rates that would be required to boost demand sufficiently to prevent falls in prices is more than halved (from approximately could justify amending some of these parameters. For example, while a β of 0.99 implies a deterministic-steady state value of the interest rate equal to 4%, the stochastic mean would be below that. For this reason we verified that our results continue to fold for lower values of beta -including β of 0.982, which yields an ergodic mean of the interest rate equal to four percent.
A sensitivity analysis for other parameters is presented below. 16 In particular, we compute a third order approximation of the Euler equation using perturbation methods as implemented in Dynare++ and Perturbation AIM. As mentioned previously, third order is the lowest which allows us examine changes in the precautionary saving motive. Figures 3 -4 also illustrate that the differences in the responses are smaller when we reduce the habit parameter (h), the volatility of the productivity shock (σ 2 y ) or the habit persistence parameter (φ). So, in line with the analytical results, the simulations suggest that a central bank following an interest rate rule should be less aggressive in the face of productivity shocks. If one believes that the benchmark calibration correctly captures how uncertainty affect economic dynamics, our exercise would additionally suggest that the effects of precautionary savings can be quantitatively relevant. Figure 6 demonstrates numerically that the response of the natural rate to a negative preference shock is magnified when the precautionary savings channel is taken into account. Agents' increased desire to save exacerbates the initial shock and calls for more accommodative policy -i.e. bigger cuts in rates. But 17 More formally the black line is generated by a policy function from which the 2nd order σσ correction as well as the 3rd order σσx terms have been deleted. See also Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) for more details. the quantitative impact of the precautionary saving effect on the natural rate is smaller than in the case of productivity shocks. This is a reflection of the lower persistence of such shocks relative to productivity shocks.
Allowing for a fully nonlinear approximation of the model
Until now we had focused on the precautionary savings channel through which uncertainty affects the behavior of interest rates. Nevertheless, other channels are present if we consider a fully non-linear approximation of our model. So far we have considered a linear labor-leisure decision, 18 but if we compare a first and third order approximation of this condition (see section A.2 in the Appendix) we can see that excess consumption -i.e. consumption relative to the habit levelreacts by more to changes in consumption when third order moments are incorporated. This implies that agents' marginal rate of intertemporal substitution
18 Given that we assume that the central bank targets price stability, the labor-leisure decision is the relevant condition to be approximated to higher order.
is also more sensitive to changes in consumption. As a result, agents' desire to smooth consumption will be larger at third order. So non-linearities in the laborleisure decision (more specifically, non-linearities in excess consumption) increase the intertemporal substitution effect. Figure 7 illustrates this result for the case of a positive productivity shockwith the dashed line representing the case in which the entire model is approximated to third order. As we can see, the natural rate in this model reacts by more than in the case in which only the Euler Equation is approximated to higher order. Nevertheless, the response of interest rates under a third order approximation of the entire model is still smaller than in the fully linear model. That is, the stronger intertemporal substitution effect partially offsets the precautionary savings effects that come about once we allow for non-linearities. But our result that overall precautionary savings dampen the response of the natural rate to productivity shock remains.
Assessing the performance of a misspecified Taylor rule
We now investigate policy errors which a central bank would make if it incorrectly ignored changes in the strength of agents' precautionary savings motive when setting interest rates. More specifically, we assume that the central bank follows a Taylor rule given by
where r n t is the nominal interest rate, y * t is the flexible price allocation of output, and r * t is the natural rate of interest defined in Equation (11) -i.e. one consistent with price stability in a 'linear', risk-free world. Table 2 shows the implications of this policy for inflation and the output gap. 19 We see that whereas the Taylor rule given by Equation (19) ensures zero 19 Note that in this exercise we use a nominal version of the Euler equation, given that the inflation and output gap volatility in a linear world, where the natural rate is driven purely by the 'intertemporal-substitution' channel, this is no longer the case when uncertainty influences agents' behavior. More specifically, in that case, the wrong policy increases the standard deviation of the output gap and inflation by 0.4pp.
While our numerical results suggest that implications of 'policy mistakes'
are not large, this is partially driven by consumption in our model being very insensitive to changes in the interest rate. If we were to reduce the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and consider the case of log utility, this sensitivity would increase and with it the standard deviation of the output gap and inflation.
Furthermore, in our calibration the Phillips curve is quite flat, so even if the Taylor rule does not fully stabilize the output gap, this does not translate into a volatile inflation rate (see fifth column of Table 2 ) -i.e. under a slightly changed calibration these policy errors could become larger.
The concluding observation is that decreasing the level of uncertainty would also lower the size of the inflation and output gap volatility. That is, lower uncertainty would decrease the size of policy mistakes. Thus, in these settings if central banks have good luck (i.e. they confront a stable economic environment), this will also translate into good policy (i.e. low policy mistakes). This result, which is consistent with Figure 3 , is illustrated in column 6 of Table 2.
Conclusion
Our results show that, following persistent, adverse shocks policy-makers might be well advised to aim off predictions of linear models and conduct more accommodative policy -particularly in highly turbulent periods. Equally, when demand and supply conditions are improving, taking note of the precautionary central bank is assumed to control the level of the nominal interest rate.
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saving motives justifies 'leaning against the wind'. Since the size of the precautionary correction is increasing in the degree of volatility, mistakenly ignoring this channel would be most costly during highly turbulent periods.
In order to obtain intuitive results and single out the precautionary savings channel, our analysis proceeded in a stylized model. An investigation of the impact of other risk channels in a fully fledged DSGE model might also be of interest. Moreover, formally accounting for stochastic volatility in a model with investment (in light of the analysis in Bloom (2009)) and enriching the framework by considering Epstein-Zin preferences (as in Bansal and Yaron (2004) ) would both make for interesting extensions. 20 20 Epstein-Zin preferences would be of particular interest since, with this specification it is possible to calibrate separately the precautionary and the intertemporal smoothing motives for savings.
APPENDIX -DERIVATIONS & TABLES
The logarithm of the stochastic discount factor is given by
and so
It thus follows that
as the conditional expectations of all t-dated variables can be eliminated.
Up to a second order approximation (which is all we need to compute a thirdorder accurate expression for var t m t+1 ) we get
where we used the fact that the habit at time t + 1 depends only on variables known at time t and so we changed the notation of x t+1 to x t . We also defined
We can now compute a third order approximation to the var t s t+1 and to that of cov t (c t+1 , s t+1 ). From the definition
where again expectations of all t-dated variables were eliminated. It is easy to see that
Consider the case in which shocks follow an AR(1) process, i.e.
where ε y and ε d are independent (cross-sectionally and inter-temporally). As shown above, to compute the variance of m t+1 we need expressions for var t c t+1 and cov t (c t+1 , c 2 t+1 ).
We know that
where Ψ 2 = ρ(1 − h) −1 + η and where cov t ( d,t+1 , y,t+1 ) = 0.
By a similar token
Since the shocks are assumed Gaussian and uncorrelated, we can write
Using equalities (26) and (27) in equation (23 ) yields
where Similarly, plugging (26) and (27) into equation (24) and denoting
We can then use equations (26), (28) and (29) in (21) to obtain var t m t+1 = ρ 2 σ 2 d + η 2 σ 2 y (ρ + η(1 − h)) 2 1 + 2h(ρ + η) (ρ + η(1 − h)) x t − 2h γ dem ε d,t + ηγ prod ε y,t (ρ + η(1 − h)) .
Given that x t = x t+1 and so, x t = c t (1 − φ) + φx t we get
Recalling the definition of c t -equation (25) c t = ρ(1 − h) −1 + η −1 ρ(1 − h) −1 hx t + ε d,t + ηε y,t
and plugging it into the expression derived above yields, after simplifying var t m t+1 = 1 − 2h((1 − h)(ρ + η)(φ − 1) + (ρ + η(1 − h))γ dem ) (ρ + η(1 − h)) 2 ε d,t − 2hη((1 − h)(ρ + η)(φ − 1) + (ρ + η(1 − h))γ prod ) (ρ + η(1 − h)) 2 ε y,t + 2h(ρ + η)((1 − h)η + ρ(1 − h(φ − 1))) (ρ + η(1 − h)) 2
which is the expression reported in the body of the text.
A.1. The covariance term cov t ( m t+1 , ∆ε d,t+1 )
In line with the reasoning of the previous section, we can write
Note that the coefficients on ε y,t and ε d,t are negative, so the covariance term always moves countercyclically. The coefficient multiplying x t is negative when ρ 2 (1 − φ) > ηφ, but given that x t is predetermined, this would not affect the countercyclicality of the covariance term.
A.2. A third order approximation of the Labour-Leisure decision
Under flexible prices, or if the central bank successfully stabilizes inflation, Equation (9) can be written as
or, given that Y T = C T and defining C e T := C T − hX T
Simply taking logs yields log(ξ d,T ) − ρ log (C e T ) = log σ σ − 1 + η log C T − η log(ξ y,T ).
Given the steady state condition for C T and C e T , this simplifies to ε d,t − ρ log C e T /C e = η log(C t /C) − ηε y,t
or ε d,t − ρc e t = ηc t − ηε y,t .
In order to obtain a third order approximation of the labour leisure decision in terms of consumption, we need to expand excess consumption c e t to third order. It follows that (1 − h) −1 (c t − hx t ) · 1 − 1 2(1 − h) (c t − hx t ) + 1 3(1 − h) 2 (c t − hx t ) 2 .
So, the labour leisure decision can be written as ηc t + ρ(1 − h) −1 (c t − hx t ) · 1 − (c t − hx t ) 2(1 − h) + (c t − hx t ) 2 3(1 − h) 2 = ηε y,t + ε d,t . (36) 
